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We explore how consumers justify successful and unsuccessful choice outcomes that are made by the self or by expert others. Two
experiments show that satisfaction with the same outcome is not only due to the outcome itself or to who has made the choice.
Satisfaction depends on how consumers explain the outcome. When consumers justify the outcome with the decision maker’s ability
to find the best choice, perceived good (poor) ability generates more (less) satisfaction; however, when outcomes are justified by
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SYMPOSIUM SUMMARY
Justification and Choice
Aner Sela, Stanford University, USA
Jonah Berger, University of Pennsylvania, USA
SESSION OVERVIEW
Justification, namely, the use of accessible reasons for resolv-
ing the conflict and guilt associated with choice, is important to
understanding consumers’ behavior and their ensuing satisfaction.
However, while research has demonstrated the significance of
justification-based processes in consumer choice (e.g., Simonson
1992; Kivetz and Simonson 2002; Kivetz and Zheng 2006), we still
know relatively little about the factors that moderate and inform
these general processes. The present session seeks to provide an in-
depth look at justification-based processes by examining their
situational and motivational antecedents as well as the different
ways in which they shape choice and satisfaction. How do features
of the choice-set, prior beliefs, and emotions both provoke and
moderate justification processes? Can the same justification be
used in different contexts to arrive at different choice outcomes?
How much are good justifications worth to consumers? The session
will address these and related questions as it works to deepen our
understanding of the role of justification in choice.
Khan, Dhar, and Fishbach (paper 1) examine the motivational
role of guilt in indulgent choices and justification processes. Unlike
past research which has generally assumed that people who feel
guilty should abstain from indulging, this research suggests that
guilt can sometimes increase rather than decrease indulgence.
Three studies demonstrate that priming guilt creates a motivation to
feel not-guilty, leading people to interpret their mundane choices as
virtuous and use these virtuous choices as justifications to relapse
and indulge.
Sela, Berger, and Liu (paper 2) develop a justification-based
framework to understand how assortment size influences the type
of options consumers select. More options make choice more
difficult which, in turn, increases reliance on available justifica-
tions for choice. Six studies illustrate that increasing the number of
options often increases the choice of utilitarian options because
these tend to be easier to justify. However, when situational factors
provide an accessible justification to indulge, increasing the num-
ber of options can have the opposite effect, leading to increased
selection of indulgences.
Botti and Burson (paper 3) examine how consumers justify
successful and unsuccessful decision outcomes and propose that
consumers’ satisfaction can be influenced by a belief-based justifi-
cation process. Three studies document instances in which partici-
pants are either more or less satisfied with expert-made choices than
their own, even when the two outcomes are the same. The findings
suggest that satisfaction with choice is not only due to the outcome
or to who has made the choice. Beliefs about the decision-maker’s
ability to find the option that best matches preferences also deter-
mines consumers’ ability to justify the choice’s outcome.
Keinan, Kivetz, and Netzer (paper 4) examine consumers’
motivated tendency to overvalue certain justifications. This re-
search demonstrates how adding a small utilitarian feature to a
luxury good can serve to justify the indulgent purchase and reduce
the associated guilt. Six studies suggest that consumers tend to
overvalue such minor product features that serve to justify indul-
gent choices. This overvaluation is found to be mediated by guilt
and is more likely to occur when the purchase seems wasteful and
frivolous.
Taken together, the four papers in this session extend and
deepen our understanding of choice justification processes and how
they interact with features of the choice set (e.g., assortment),
beliefs (e.g., about choice competence), and affect (e.g., guilt). The
session would be of interest to researchers and marketers interested
in consumer judgment and decision making, choice theory and
assortments, affect and emotions, and the effect of the choice
process on preference and satisfaction.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACTS
 “Guilt as Motivation: The Role of Guilt in Choice
Justification”
Uzma Khan, Stanford University, USA
Ravi Dhar, Yale University, USA
Ayelet Fishbach, University of Chicago, USA
Guilt plays an important role in consumer choices and self-
control (Khan et al. 2005). However, to this point, it is unclear
whether guilt only influences choice through emotional experience
when people feel guilty, or whether it can also be a motivational
state whereby people strive to avoid experiencing guilt. Whether
guilt is an emotional or a motivational state further determines what
affect guilt-primes have on indulgence. Past research has generally
treated guilt as an emotion that steers consumers away from
indulgence. According to this research, priming guilt-related words
reduces indulgence by inducing guilty experience (Giner-Sorolla
2001; Zemack-Rugar et al. 2007). The underlying assumption is
that guilt-primes create an affective state through direct assimila-
tion with the prime. That is, people actually feel guilty when primed
with guilt-related concepts and this feeling prevents them from
indulging.
An alternative view explored in current research is that guilt
acts as a motivational state. We propose that guilt-primes increase
the motivation to avoid guilt, which guides the interpretation of
means to achieve this goal state. For example, imagine Jane, who
after picking up a diet-coke and is choosing between an unhealthy
pizza and a healthy salad for lunch. We argue that she will interpret
her choice of a diet-coke differently depending on her level of
motivation to avoid guilt. If she is primed with guilt, she is more
likely to use the diet-coke as a justification to have pizza (due to
heightened motivations to avoid guilty) than if she is not primed.
More generally, we suggest that guilt-primes motivate consumers
to interpret their decisions as virtuous in order to avoid guilt and
feeling virtuous can paradoxically lead to MORE and NOT less
indulgence.
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Formally, we propose that 1) guilt-primes can create a motiva-
tion avoid guilt 2) higher motivation to avoid guilt promotes
interpretation of mundane choices as virtuous 3) these virtuous
choices then serve as guilt-reducing justifications for further indul-
gence. Three studies support our theory. In Study 1 we primed
participants with neutral (control) or guilt-related words (guilt-
prime condition) in a scrambled-sentence task. Next, they con-
sumed chocolate as part of a taste-test. Half of them were given a
diet-coke to be consumed after the taste-test. We assumed that diet-
coke can serve as a guilt-reducing justification when motivation to
avoid guilt is high and can justify chocolate consumption. Consis-
tent with our theory, ANOVA of chocolate consumption yielded a
2 (Guilt-Prime: Yes vs. No) x 2 (Diet-Coke: Present vs. Absent)
interaction; i.e., participants primed with guilt consumed more
chocolate when they were given a diet-coke (M=51gm) as com-
pared to when they were not (M=28gm). However, in control
condition chocolate consumed was not significantly different when
diet-coke was present (M=28gm) or not (M=37gm). Results sup-
port the notion that a diet-coke is interpreted as a guilt-reducing
justification and allows greater indulgence when the motivation to
avoid guilt is strong (i.e., when guilt is primed) but not in absence
of such motivation.
Building on the motivational view of guilt, we further predict
that virtuous choices in presence of a guilt-prime can directly
reduce experience of guilt. Study 2 demonstrated this effect of guilt-
prime on experienced guilt for a fixed amount of indulgence. We
predicted that individuals primed with guilt would experience less
guilt than those not primed if they are given a guilt-reducing
justification (e.g., diet coke). Again we employed a 2 (Guilt-Prime:
Yes vs. No) X 2 (Diet-Coke: Present vs. Absent) design. Instead of
measuring consumption, all participants ate one donut and indi-
cated their experienced guilt. ANOVA of guilt-ratings yielded the
predicted guilt-prime X diet-coke interaction. Further analyses
revealed that when diet-coke was offered participants primed with
guilt experienced less guilt than those not primed with guilt.
Recent research has shown that initial virtuous choices serve
as guilt-reducing justifications and lead to indulgence in subse-
quent decisions (Khan and Dhar 2006). Study 3 shows that an initial
choice is more effective as a justification when guilt is primed.
Specifically, participants made two choices 1) between two high-
brow magazines and 2) between highbrow and lowbrow movies.
Prior to the choices, half of the participants were primed with guilt.
As predicted, those primed with guilt were more likely to choose a
lowbrow movie (50%) than those not primed (26%). We explain
that an initial virtuous choice is more likely to be viewed as a
justification and lead to more indulgence when the motivation to
avoid guilt is strong.
Our findings add to justification research by showing how
guilt-primes can increase indulgence through a motivation to avoid
guilt, which leads to interpretation of mundane decisions as virtu-
ous justifications. Secondly, we contribute to priming research
(e.g., Bargh et al. 2001) by suggesting a motivational role of guilt-
primes, which is significantly different from an affect-assimilation
account. This also provides a mechanism to distinguish between
goal-related vs. semantic primes. We suggest that priming a moti-
vational state can strengthen or inhibit a goal depending on the level
of goal attainment experienced.
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“Variety, Vice, and Virtue: How Assortment Size Influences
Option Choice”
Aner Sela, Stanford University, USA
Jonah Berger, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Wendy Liu, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in how variety
influences consumer choice (Iyengar and Lepper 2000) and sat-
isfaction (Schwartz 2004). This research has offered an important
corrective to the notion that more choice is always better by
demonstrating that too many options can lead consumers not to
choose at all, and to feel less satisfaction and more regret about the
options they do choose. But while this work has provided insight
into how the number of available options affects choice likelihood,
could assortment size also influence the type of choices consumers
make?
To address this question, we develop a justification-based
framework that examines how assortment size influences the choice
between vice and virtue. Specifically, we argue that because choos-
ing from greater assortments is often more difficult, it may lead to
greater reliance on accessible reasons and justifications. Because
some options may be easier to justify than others, this in turn should
affect the type of options consumers end up selecting. Prior work
has demonstrated that people generally find virtues easier to justify
than vices (e.g., Kivetz and Simonson 2002; Kivetz and Zheng
2006). Consequently, we propose that choosing from larger assort-
ments should often lead people to select relatively virtuous or
utilitarian options. However, when situational factors provide ac-
cessible justifications to indulge, choosing from larger assortments
should lead people to select more hedonic options.
Six studies, involving both hypothetical and real choice,
support these hypotheses. Compared to people choosing from a
relatively small set of options, those choosing from an enlarged set
were more likely to choose reduced fat ice-cream over regular ice
cream (Experiment 1A), select fruit over cookies as a lunchtime
snack (Experiment 1B), and use a gift-certificate to obtain a printer
rather than an mp3 player (Experiment 2). The studies also provide
insight into the mechanism underlying these effects. Consistent
with the notion that the effect of assortment size was driven by
increased effort and conflict, it was found to be mediated by
experienced choice difficulty (Experiment 3). In addition, the effect
depended on whether the overall number of options was increased
rather than which option category saw the increase. Thus, increas-
ing the number of just the hedonic or utilitarian options in the choice
set was sufficient to increase the choice likelihood of the utilitarian
options.
Moreover, consistent with the notion that variety influences
choice through reliance on accessible justification, manipulations
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that provided accessible reasons to indulge reversed the effect
(Experiments 4 and 5). People who were given false feedback that
they had exerted a great deal of effort on a task, and thus had an
accessible “excuse” for selecting vice, were actually more likely to
select a hedonic consumer good over a utilitarian one when choos-
ing from an enlarged choice set than when choosing from a small
choice set. In contrast, people who were told they had exerted
relatively little effort were more likely to choose the utilitarian
consumer good when choosing from the larger choice set. Simi-
larly, people who felt “licensed” to indulge due to a virtuous choice
they had made in an unrelated task were more likely to select a
hedonic product rather than a utilitarian equivalent when choosing
from a larger set, but people who did not make the “licensing”
choice were more likely to select the utilitarian product from the
enlarged set.
Taken together, these studies illustrate that variety not only
influences whether consumers make a choice, but also what they
end up choosing. Furthermore, they highlight the key role of
justifications in these effects. Thus, the effect of variety on option
choice was contingent on what type of justifications was available
to people at the time of choice.
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“Choice Satisfaction Can Be the Luck of the Draw”
Katherine A. Burson, University of Michigan, USA
Simona Botti, London Business School, UK
In this research, we explore how consumers justify both
successful and unsuccessful choice outcomes depending on whether
they or an expert has made the decision. We show that self-expert
differences in satisfaction with choice outcomes depend on how
consumers justify these outcomes. Two studies document instances
in which participants’ satisfaction with expert-made choices rela-
tive to their own varies even when the choice outcomes are the
same. The results of these experiments show that satisfaction for the
same outcome is not only due to the outcome itself or the decision
maker, but on how consumers explain the outcome. When consum-
ers justify the outcome with the decision maker’s ability to make the
best choice, perceived good (poor) ability generates more (less)
satisfaction. However, when outcomes are justified by factors
external to the decision maker’s ability, there is no effect of
outcome on satisfaction.
Prior research suggests that ultimate satisfaction with choice
outcomes depends on the extent to which that outcome can be
justified by the chooser’s capability to make the best choice
(Weiner 1985). Thus, factors that influence the way in which these
abilities are assessed will also influence eventual outcome satisfac-
tion. The correspondence bias (Jones & Nisbett 1972) is one of
these factors. When a choice outcome can be explained entirely by
context, consumers consider this fact and are likely to temper their
perceptions of the role of their own ability in the outcome. How-
ever, they are likely to persist in crediting that outcome exclusively
to an expert’s ability. Consequently, participants will tend to be
more satisfied with an expert’s positive choice outcome than their
own because they can justify it more readily with the expert’s ability
to make good choices, even when self and expert achieve identical
choice outcomes. In contrast, participants will tend to be less
satisfied with an expert’s negative outcome than their own because
they justify it more readily with the experts’ lack of ability to make
good choices.
The first study examined perceptions of abilities and subse-
quent choice satisfaction in the domain of medical treatment
choices. Participants either chose their own treatment from a choice
set or were assigned a treatment by an expert and then given
feedback that the treatment had succeeded or failed. Consistent
with our expectations, participants were more likely to temper their
own ability assessments than an expert’s when the outcome was
negative. This lead to more middling satisfaction for self-chosen
than expert-chosen outcomes. Mediational analyses confirmed that
the self-expert difference in outcome was the result of perceived
choice ability.
In the second experiment, we test these predictions in an
investment domain. Participants either personally chose a mutual
fund or had one assigned by an expert. Half of participants were then
given feedback that the fund had either increased or decreased.
They were also provided with feedback about the unchosen funds.
The unchosen funds increased when the chosen fund increased and
decreased when the chosen fund decreased, by the same percent as
the chosen fund. When feedback was absent, self and expert ability
assessment did not differ. When the feedback suggested that the
market explained the choice outcome, self-ability assessments
were middling while expert-evaluations were inflated for good
outcomes and deflated for bad outcomes. Despite this unequivocal
feedback about the market, participants were biased in their incor-
poration of this situational explanation for the outcome. Media-
tional analyses show again that the self-expert differences in
outcome depends n perceived choice ability.
Taken together, these two studies show that assessments of an
expert’s choice ability depend mainly on the choice outcome, while
self-evaluations are often tempered by contextual information if it
is available. Because satisfaction depends on participants’ opportu-
nity to justify choice outcomes with choice ability, participants are
frequently more satisfied with a positive choice outcome produced
by an expert than by the same outcome resulting from their own
choice. When the outcome is negative, participants are less satisfied
with the expert-chosen outcome than the identical self-chosen
outcome.
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“Functional Alibi”
Anat Keinan, Harvard Business School, USA
Ran Kivetz, Columbia University, USA
Oded Netzer, Columbia University, USA
“Every vice has its excuse ready” (Publilius Syrus)
Marketers of luxury products face two major challenges.
Marketers have to first appeal to consumers’ desire and imagina-
tion, and create a demand for something which is not really needed.
Accordingly, marketing scholars and practitioners have stressed
the importance of appealing to consumers’ fantasies and senses,
connecting with their hopes, wishes and dreams, and satisfying
their emotional desires (Holbrook and Hirschman 1982;
Schmitt1999; LaSalle 2003; Danziger 2005).
However, creating a desire or a craving for the luxury product
is not enough; consumers may desire such products but still feel
guilty spending money on non-practical luxuries and avoid pur-
chasing them (Kivetz and Simonson 2002; Kivetz and Keinan
2006; Keinan and Kivetz 2008). Since luxuries are “by definition
superfluous” and “neither beneficial nor useful” (Thomson 1987),
the purchase and consumption of such products seems wasteful and
even immoral, and consequently is difficult to justify.
Thus, a second important challenge that luxury marketers need
to overcome is appealing to consumers’ conscience and providing
them with an excuse or an “alibi” that would justify their profligate
purchase, and make the purchase seem “rational” and logical. Such
alibis can help consumers overcome their guilt, and view their
purchase decisions as influenced by product functionality rather
than by non-practical considerations and desires.
In the present research, we demonstrate how righteous con-
sumers rationalize their frivolous behavior by inflating the per-
ceived value of minor functional features or aspects of the luxury
product. We argue that small utilitarian aspects of a seemingly
wasteful product or service can serve as “functional alibis.” For
example, consumers whose cars never touch a dirt road often justify
the purchase of an extravagant SUV by its performance in extreme
driving conditions. Similarly, consumers often mention a protec-
tive cell phone pocket to justify the purchase of the multi-hundred
dollars Coach or Louis Vuitton purses.
We demonstrate that consumers tend to overvalue features (or
products) that serve as a functional alibi. Such small utilitarian
additions to a hedonic luxury are often valued more than their
standalone value since they provide additional utility from serving
as a functional alibi and justifying the purchase. Accordingly, the
willingness to pay for a luxury product connected to a utilitarian
product (or feature) will be higher than the WTP for each product
sold separately:
WTP (Luxury + utilitarian addition)>WTP (Luxury) + WTP
(utilitarian addition).
Six studies explore the effect of adding a functional alibi on
consumers’ willingness to pay, purchase intentions, choices, and
emotions of guilt. We show that the overvaluation of the added
utilitarian product (or feature) is mediated by feelings of guilt
associated with purchasing the hedonic luxury. Moreover, we
demonstrate that such functional alibis are valued more when the
purchase seems wasteful and induces guilt. We show that consum-
ers who view luxury purchases as wasteful will be more likely to
overvalue small utilitarian features that are attached to luxury
products. Additionally, we demonstrate that small utilitarian addi-
tions are valued more when they are attached to hedonic rather than
utilitarian products.
We explore the effect of the functional alibi in a variety
marketing contexts (and across the 4Ps of marketing planning),
including product upgrades, product positioning, new products
features, product bundling, pricing, cross selling, advertising, and
sales promotions. Moreover, we examine the effect of connecting
a variety of functional alibis to various products and services
including personal luxuries (clothing and apparel, fashion accesso-
ries, watches, cosmetics and fragrances), home luxuries (consumer
electronics, hi-tech gadgets, and luxury furniture) and experiential
luxuries (hotels and vacations, travel, and entertainment).
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